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Abstract In response to widespread policy prescriptions for responsible innova-
tion, social scientists and engineering ethicists, among others, have sought to engage
natural scientists and engineers at the ‘midstream’: building interdisciplinary col-
laborations to integrate social and ethical considerations with research and devel-
opment processes. Two ‘laboratory engagement studies’ have explored how
applying the framework of midstream modulation could enhance the reﬂections of
natural scientists on the socio-ethical context of their work. The results of these
interdisciplinary collaborations conﬁrm the utility of midstream modulation in
encouraging both ﬁrst- and second-order reﬂective learning. The potential for sec-
ond-order reﬂective learning, in which underlying value systems become the object
of reﬂection, is particularly signiﬁcant with respect to addressing social responsi-
bility in research practices. Midstream modulation served to render the socio-ethical
context of research visible in the laboratory and helped enable research participants
to more critically reﬂect on this broader context. While lab-based collaborations
would beneﬁt from being carried out in concert with activities at institutional and
policy levels, midstream modulation could prove a valuable asset in the toolbox of
interdisciplinary methods aimed at responsible innovation.
Keywords Midstream modulation  Technology assessment  Ethics of science
and technology  Social responsibility  Socio-technical integration
Science policies in the US, Europe and elsewhere have in recent years called for
‘responsible innovation’ in science and technology, implying that social and ethical
considerations should be integrated with research and development (R&D)
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DOI 10.1007/s11948-011-9317-8processes (21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act 2003;
European Commission 2004, 2007; Netherlands Organisation for Scientiﬁc
Research 2008). Political concern for the societal impact of science and technology
is in itself nothing new (cf. Roosevelt 1936). What distinguishes recent policies is a
widespread interest in socio-technical integration at the ‘midstream’: ‘co-operative’
or ‘interdisciplinary’ research that targets early stage R&D decisions, as opposed to
‘upstream’ funding or ‘downstream’ regulatory decisions (Fisher et al. 2006). The
European Commission for instance aims to: ‘‘encourage actors in their own
disciplines and ﬁelds to participate in developing Science in Society perspectives
from the very beginning of the conception of their activities’’ (European
Commission 2007, p. 6).
While these mandates mark a political interest in interdisciplinary research
efforts to integrate social and ethical concerns at early stages of R&D, the
appropriate means by which such integration is to occur is still open to
experimentation. The recently developed framework of midstream modulation
(MM) opens one potential avenue for interdisciplinary collaboration in the research
laboratory.
1 Two ‘laboratory engagement studies’ (Fisher 2007) have applied this
framework to address the question of social responsibility in research practices,
focusing on researchers’ critical reﬂections on the broader socio-ethical context of
their work. These studies sought to gauge to what extent MM could help render
more visible the broader context of laboratory research, and whether research
participants considered critical reﬂection on this broader context to be relevant.
Engaging Researchers with the Socio-Ethical Context of Their Work
Contrary to the ‘neutrality view’ of social responsibility—the notion that the social
responsibility of researchers is exhausted by the disinterested pursuit of scientiﬁc
knowledge—scholars have argued that the social responsibility of researchers should
include critical reﬂection on the socio-ethical context of their work (Verhoog 1980).
This normative stance reﬂects recent observations in ethical and normative
scholarship (cf. Douglas 2009), including engineering ethics and the ethics of
science and technology. Several engineering ethicists have argued for the early
assessment of moral issues in technological design by direct involvement of
scientists and engineers. Van de Poel and Van Gorp have similarly argued that
‘‘designing engineers have a moral duty to reﬂect on the ethically relevant choices
they make during the design process’’ (2006, p. 335). While laboratory science
differs in many ways from engineering, similar challenges have been voiced in
relation to laboratory science. According to Ziman, ‘‘the transformation of science
into a new type of social institution’’ requires that the ethical dimensions of research
should become part of the ‘ethos’ of science (1998, p. 1813). Accordingly, various
1 Various interdisciplinary approaches aimed at broadening research decision making have recently
emerged, including trading zones (Gorman et al. 2004), ethical parallel research (Zwart et al. 2006),
biographical narratives (Consoli 2008), co-evolutionary scenarios (Robinson 2009), and attempts to
increase the ‘moral imagination’ of researchers (Van der Burg 2009). A comparison among these
approaches is beyond the scope of this paper.
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ethical challenges posed by new and emerging science and technology (Herkert
2009, personal communication; Khushf 2006; Moor 2005; Schuurbiers et al. 2009b).
If ethical and normative scholarship has established a moral imperative for, and a
general vision towards, integrating such reﬂection into research, it has been less
clear on how to implement this vision. Theoretically established claims that
scientists and engineers should reﬂect on the normative dimensions of their work do
not in themselves enforce or encourage such reﬂection. Indeed, policy calls for
ethical reﬂection may have at best a tangential effect on research practices because
researchers generally perceive the broader socio-ethical context of research as
peripheral to their work (Guston 2000; Rappert 2007; Schuurbiers et al. 2009a). The
question of implementation can thus stymie broad normative commitments to
ethical reﬂection in research practice. The studies presented here sought to tackle
this challenge by supplementing the descriptive techniques of MM with the explicit
normative commitment of an ‘embedded ethicist’. While MM is more attuned to
raising ‘reﬂexive awareness’ among R&D practitioners (Fisher et al. 2006), could it
offer possibilities for deﬁning a context-sensitive form of ethics, using ethnographic
methods that would open up the ‘black box of science and technology’ to normative
inquiry (Van de Poel and Verbeek 2006)?
Midstream Modulation
Midstream modulation is a framework for guiding intervention-oriented activities in
the laboratory that aims to elucidate and enhance the ‘responsive capacity’ of
laboratories to the broader societal dimensions of their work (Fisher et al. 2006).
2
Developed by Erik Fisher during a three-year laboratory engagement study, MM has
been applied in a range of laboratories around the world as a form of ‘socio-
technical integration research’, or STIR (Fisher and Guston 2008).
3 MM extends
more traditional laboratory ethnographies by augmenting participant observation
methods with distinct engagement tools that allow for feedback, discussion and
exploration of research decisions in light of their societal and ethical dimensions.
An ‘embedded’ social or human scientist interacts with laboratory practitioners by
closely following and documenting their research, attending laboratory meetings,
holding regular interviews and collaboratively articulating decisions as they occur
through the use of a protocol
4 that maps the evolution of research and helps feed
2 More precisely, ‘midstream modulation’ denotes both a framework for interdisciplinary collaboration
and a conceptualization of the work of the laboratory practitioner. In the latter sense, ‘midstream
modulation’ refers to ongoing laboratory practices. The collaborative work of the practitioner and the
embedded scholar can then be described as ‘socio-technical integration’.
3 STIR also denotes an NSF-funded, coordinated set of twenty laboratory engagement studies, of which
this study is a part. See: http://cns.asu.edu/stir/. Website accessed 5 October 2011.
4 The STIR protocol is a generic tool for mapping laboratory decisions in real-time. The protocol
conceptually distinguishes four decision components: opportunity, considerations, alternatives and
outcomes. The protocol enables identifying otherwise latent values, goals, and other considerations and
creates opportunities to reﬂect upon the decisions.
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Regular use of the protocol allows for collaborative exploration of the nature of
research decisions, with the ultimate aim of shaping technological trajectories by
rethinking the processes that help characterize them (Fisher et al. 2006).
Since the general possibility and utility of MM was tested in an earlier pilot study
(Fisher 2007), the studies presented here aimed to explore the extent to which MM
could be applied to enhance lab-based critical reﬂections on the broader socio-
ethical context of research. As such they attempted to bring together the normative
approaches of the ethics of science and technology with the descriptive richness of
science and technology studies (STS) (Radder 1998; Van de Poel and Verbeek
2006; Zuiderent-Jerak and Jensen 2007). These research studies asked two
questions: (1) How can broader social and ethical dimensions of research be
rendered visible in the laboratory? and (2) Do laboratory practitioners perceive
critical reﬂection on the broader socio-ethical context of their work to be relevant?
First- and Second-Order Reﬂective Learning
To assess the research ﬁndings in light of these questions, I distinguish between
ﬁrst- and second-order reﬂective learning (Van de Poel and Zwart 2009; cf. Sclove
1995; Wynne 1995; Schot and Rip 1997; Grin and van der Graaf 1996). First-order
reﬂective learning is an iterative process by which a professional experimentally
ﬁnds solutions to problems using several lines of inquiry. This process ‘‘takes place
within the boundaries of a value system and background theories’’ (Van de Poel and
Zwart 2009, p. 7). First-order reﬂective learning thus concerns ‘‘improvement of the
technology and the improved achievement of one’s own interests in the network.’’
Second-order reﬂective learning, on the other hand, ‘‘requires a person to reﬂect on
his or her background theories and value system’’ (Van de Poel and Zwart 2009,
p. 7). In second-order learning, value systems become the object of learning while in
ﬁrst-order learning these are taken for granted.
This distinction can be applied to the social responsibility of researchers: ﬁrst-
order reﬂective learning is reﬂection ‘within’ the research system. Van de Poel and
Zwart note, ‘‘In ﬁrst-order reﬂective learning, moral issues are dealt with within the
bounds of the background theories and are approached from within the value system
of the actor’’ (Van de Poel and Zwart 2009, p. 7). In terms of responsibility, such
forms of reﬂection involve compliance to one’s internal responsibilities towards the
research community such as the responsible conduct of research and environmental
health and safety. Second-order reﬂective learning involves reﬂection ‘on’ the
research system, including the value-based socio-ethical premises that drive
research, the methodological norms of the research culture, and the epistemological
and ontological assumptions upon which science is founded (Verhoog 1980): the
background theories and values of the research system itself become the object of
learning.
The value of MM with respect to the challenge for the ethics of science and
technology lies in its ability to support second-order reﬂective learning. In addition
to several instances of ﬁrst-order learning that occurred as a result of the
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ethical context of lab work. Note that the studies did not assume that laboratory
practitioners have a general ‘reﬂexive deﬁcit’, or that scholars from the humanities
and social sciences are somehow more reﬂexive. Rather, they sought to test the
hypothesis that social scientiﬁc and humanistic practitioner knowledge could
complement, through interdisciplinary collaboration, natural scientiﬁc practitioner
knowledge.
Midstream Modulation in Delft and Tempe
The STIR studies described here consisted of two consecutive laboratory
engagement studies: in the Department of Biotechnology at Delft University of
Technology, The Netherlands (Fall 2008) and in the School of Life Sciences at
Arizona State University, Tempe, USA (Spring 2009). A total of eight laboratory
researchers participated in the studies. I had regular interactions during a period of
12 weeks with four of these researchers. The other four participants acted as
‘controls’, doing only the pre- and post-interviews at the beginning and end of the
study (see Table 1). The participants were all PhD students in molecular biology.
Researchers in the Delft Department of Biotechnology focused on the use of micro-
organisms for industrial production of chemicals from renewable resources and as
diagnostic systems, while those in the Tempe Photosynthesis Group applied
genomic and molecular biological techniques to elucidate physiological processes in
cyanobacteria with a view to bioenergy generation.
Data Collection
Following the MM pilot study (Fisher and Mahajan 2006), interactions with
research participants consisted of pre- and post interviews, participant observation,
regular application of the protocol and collaborative drafting of visual represen-
tations of the research process. The pre- and post-interviews enquired into the
Table 1 Research participants
University Research group Participant Interaction
Delft University of Technology Industrial Microbiology R1D High
Delft University of Technology Industrial Microbiology C1D No
Delft University of Technology Environmental
Biotechnology
R2D High
Delft University of Technology Environmental
Biotechnology
C2D No
Arizona State University Photosystem II R1A High
Arizona State University Photosystem II C1A No
Arizona State University Microbial Engineering R2A High
Arizona State University Microbial Engineering C2A No
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societal goals in the project description and changes in participants’ awareness of
and attitude towards ethical and societal dimensions of the research. The pre-
interviews marked the beginning of a period of participant observation in which I
followed the ‘high interaction’ participants, spending 8–12 h per week in the lab
and participating in regular lab meetings whenever possible.
During the research phase, the STIR protocol was applied (Fisher and Mahajan
2006; Fisher 2007; Schuurbiers and Fisher 2009). Reconstructing decisions by way
of the protocol allows for reﬂection on how the interplay of various decision
components leads to decision outcomes, constituting a collaborative process in
which both observed and reported information is reﬂected back to the practitioner
over time. The embedded scholar thus becomes ‘‘part of the convergence of goals,
strategies, and socio-material conﬁgurations’’ (Fisher and Mahajan 2010). Given the
normative background that motivated these studies, my engagements attempted, in
addition to bringing out latent MM ‘de facto’ considerations, to examine how issues
in the ethics of science and technology as such could be brought to bear on the
research process with the goal of ‘deliberately’ expanding what researchers took
into account (Fisher et al. 2006). Since the goal of STIR was to explore the extent to
which interdisciplinary interactions may serve to bring out a range of potential
latent and implicit broader issues, I tried not to determine in advance which issues
were to be considered as relevant. Indeed, a wide range of issues emerged as a result
of the interactions—and were classiﬁed only in retrospect (see Table 2).
Schematic overviews of the research progress indicate the links between the
interrelated series of decision processes mapped over the twelve-week period (e.g.,
see Fig. 1). As with the protocols, the initial drafts of these overviews were based on
earlier conversations, and were discussed regularly with participants, and adapted
on the basis of the feedback provided. New drafts were discussed at the following
meeting, and the iterative process was repeated. These overviews, and the regular
discussion of them, conﬁrmed my understanding of the unfolding research project,
built my ‘interactional expertise’ (Collins and Evans 2002), and identiﬁed
relationships between the research and the broader discussions held during the
protocol meetings.
Objects of Reﬂection
The iterative process of observation and feedback by means of the protocol and
research overviews served to render normative issues that were directly related to
the research at hand more visible to myself and my collaborators. Observation and
feedback predominantly focused on research goals (knockout or overexpression of
protein production pathways followed by phenotypic characterization) and molec-
ular biological techniques (plasmid insertion, the polymerase chain reaction [PCR],
separation gels, high performance liquid chromatography [HPLC], and so forth).
Still, reconstructing ‘technical’ decisions by way of the protocol quite naturally
brought out ‘microethics’—normative issues concerning ‘‘individuals and internal
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decision not to repeat a gel run for instance could bring out ﬁnancial and time
considerations, but also more overtly normative issues such as concerns about the
Table 2 Ethically relevant topics discussed during the lab studies
R1D R2D R1A R2A Exemplary question
Micro-ethics
Lab practices
Methods and
techniques
x x x x Will you repeat the gel run?
Research hierarchy x x x x Do you or your supervisor determine
the next step?
Lab culture x x x x Would you ask a co-worker for help?
Environmental health and safety
Worker health x x x x Why are you wearing plastic gloves now?
Health and safety
regulations
x x x x Why is the -80 freezer locked?
Environmental impact x x x x Would the cells survive if you throw them
into the lake?
Responsible conduct of research
Scientiﬁc integrity x x x x Would you use these results without
referring to the author?
Impartiality and
independence
x x x Would you follow this route, even though it
is not in the interest of your investor?
Reliability and
veriﬁability
x x x Do you think you will include these outliers
in your graph?
Macro-ethics
Ethical, legal and social aspects
Intellectual property
and patenting
x x x Are you allowed to present these data before
it is patented?
Ethics of genetic
engineering
x x x Why do you see a difference between
inserting a human gene or a mouse gene?
Dual use of synthetic
biology
x x What if everyone can order and assemble
genes as they please?
Social responsibility of researchers
Social relevance
of research
x x x x Does your research beneﬁt society?
Should it?
Ethics of promising—
hype
x x x x Why would you raise expectations in a
proposal that may well not be fulﬁlled?
Philosophy and sociology of science
Reductionism x x x Why wouldn’t the synthetic gene work as
well? A gene is a gene, right?
Underdeterminacy x x x How do you know the effect you observe is
in fact a result of your transformations?
Scientiﬁc realism
and social
constructivism
x x x Would you say scientiﬁc facts describe the
world as it is?
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(veriﬁability, impartiality, scrupulousness). Asking why research participants took
protective measures against harmful effects of carcinogens brought out personal
health and safety and environmental considerations, but could also invite a research
participant to comment on how colleagues ought to behave, or lead into a discussion
about the appropriateness of safety regulations.
In addition to the kinds of microethical discussions—lab practices, responsible
conduct of research and environmental health and safety concerns—emanating
directly from the laboratory work, the feedback processes also occasioned discussion
of macro-ethical issues, normative issues that apply ‘‘to the collective social
responsibility of the profession and to societal decisions about technology’’ (Herkert
2005, p. 373). Enquiring into the impact of a conﬁdentiality agreement on the
freedom to publish research results could lead us to examine intellectual property,
conﬁdentiality and the inﬂuence of private investors on research. A question on the
relationship between expectations raised in a research proposal and the actual work
done could serve to explore the role of promises and expectations in research,
science-policy interfaces and hype-disillusionment cycles in research. Ultimately,
repeated questions like ‘‘How do you know that the results you have just obtained are
actually a result of your transformations?’’ led to discussions on philosophical topics
like reductionism and the problem of underdeterminacy of scientiﬁc data.
Fig. 1 Drafting a research overview. Feedback from the research participant on the initial draft led to a
following draft, ultimately leading to a shared understanding of the research processes and the
considerations invoked
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questions that initiated such discussions, showing how implicit value judgments
were rendered explicit by asking ‘broader’ questions. Most of these topics were
addressed in each of the interactions, given that their discussion was dependent on
the nature and stage of the research projects as well as the particular experiments
performed at the time of study.
These ﬁndings suggest that researchers frequently deal with normative and social
issues but without necessarily labeling them as such, as the notion of de facto
modulation (Fisher and Mahajan 2006) posits. Researchers are not accustomed to
viewing their decisions from a normative perspective or discussing the normative
aspects of decisions explicitly. Such broader issues were brought into focus by
routinely asking different kinds of questions than those usually encountered in the
midst of laboratory research: questions about the normative dimensions of lab
practices, about researchers’ personal moral concerns, about the possible longer term
ethical,legalandsocialimplicationsofresearch,andsoforth(seealsoTable 2).Thus,
the methods andtechniquesofMMcanhelp renderethical andsocietaldimensionsof
research more visible to practitioners within the context of the laboratory.
In addition to these kinds of discussions brought about by applying MM methods
and techniques, several kinds of learning occurred as a result of the interactions.
This speaks to the question of whether research participants perceived critical
reﬂection on the broader socio-ethical context of their work to be relevant.
Reﬂection ‘Within’ the System
In several ways the iterative observation and feedback processes occasioned
instances of ﬁrst-order reﬂective learning, i.e., learning related to technological
improvement and the improved achievement of the researcher’s own interests. The
regular occurrence of ‘efﬁciency’ discussions, probing for possible overlooked
considerations or alternatives of a technical nature, on several occasions led to
improvement of the technology or the improved achievement of the research
participant’s interests in the situation in which he or she was working. For instance,
after observing R1A repeatedly preparing small amounts of stock solution for a gel,
I asked whether making a bigger batch could save time. Efﬁciency discussions were
a matter of trial and error: participants appreciated my effort, but had often thought
about possible alternatives already. In other cases, my questions suggested new
alternatives. Applying the protocol to a particular experiment that R2A was
performing, we determined that there was an opportunity to identify a speciﬁc
chemical compound involved in cell-to-cell communication. R2A was searching for
the compound in a bottom-up fashion, by measuring cell reactivity to different
candidate compounds. When I proposed a top-down experiment, determining the
presence of the compound in a sample where the anticipated cell communication
was already occurring, R2A replied:
My supervisor decided to do it this way. Probably the current experiment was
easiest …. But that might be the way to go, now that this doesn’t work.
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details of the experiments; probed whether an outsider’s perspective could occasion
new research opportunities; and built trust, enhancing a sense of co-labor. When I
asked R1D at some point whether our interactions led him to perceive new research
opportunities, he said:
[It happened] just now. Well, I have to look back, I have to think about what
I’ve done every now and then, to tell you what I did, so to say. So that forces
me to some kind of realization …. At the same time I’ve been working on a
presentation for a work meeting. At that moment I also realize that knocking
out those genes could well have more consequences than we think …. And
then I started reading back, like what is the capacity of that transporter, and
then I came across a calculating error …. So, on the one hand, you force me to
think, and on the other hand a work meeting forces me to think. So … it comes
from both sides so to say.
These examples indicate that regular application of the protocol facilitated ﬁrst-
order learning, although it is difﬁcult to pinpoint precisely what triggers the learning
process. R1D found his calculating error as a result of being ‘‘forced to some kind of
realization.’’ Perhaps my questions instigated this realization process, or perhaps it
emerged from thought processes developing in the researchers’ minds as they
explained their work to me. In any case, the collaborative process stimulated mutual
learning. There were other instances of this kind of learning, such as when I was
discussing one of the draft research overviews with R2A. Looking at the number of
research lines he was simultaneously pursuing, he realized how much he had taken
on, leading him to the conclusion that he needed to make decisions about which
research lines to pursue and which ones to drop:
… it’s a good following of the process …. I think you can pretty much see
how the thinking evolves, right? I mean, the ﬁrst insertion, that was my
supervisor’s idea, and then I came up with other stuff, and we get to the point
where I’m thinking about stuff that is not even cyanobacteria genes, but
something else.
When I enquired later about the relevance of our discussion, he commented that he
had never given research planning much thought, but saw the value of it now:
For me that was the most important point, that I see how much I have to do, or
have done, or how sometimes stuff gets entangled with other stuff if you never
realize that things are related. Then you end up with a contest, and
entrepreneurship, and things which you never thought about, and then … It’s
also fun to see how you have four lanes, or forks, and then one of them stops,
because you’re trying to advance the other one, and try to keep all of them
running at the same time.
Apart from efﬁciency discussions, considerations of a more explicitly normative
nature in some cases led to changes in lab practice. For instance, several research
participants who wore two plastic gloves to prevent getting acrylamide on their skin,
would subsequently open a cupboard without ﬁrst removing one of the gloves.
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attended, I noted this lack of compliance with environmental health and safety
regulations, feeding back my observation. The example sparked a hefty debate.
Some researchers in the group felt strongly about complying with such regulations,
particularly with regard to wearing lab coats, even though no one seemed to ever
wear them. A few days later I received unsolicited news that several lab members
had now started wearing lab coats again:
It [often] happened … that when I was handling ethidium bromide gels, some
drops reached my clothes, or … unprotected areas of my hands …. Meanwhile
[my] lab coat was clean and ironed on my chair …. I was thinking that one day
I should … wear mine, even though I’ll raise some eyebrows …. Then came
your presentation … and I remembered how I used to take care of my safety
and my clothes …. Monday, after the seminar, on my way to the lab, I noticed
that [S] [was wearing his] lab coat—he was spraying nitrogen on some
concentrated samples and needed to protect his clothes. I said to myself,
‘‘[Now is] the moment. If I [do it now there] will be two [of us] wearing … lab
coats’’. I … [wore] it for the rest of the [time].
Apparently, the presence of an outsider in the lab enabled a change in laboratory
practice,asaresultofrenderingexplicitanddiscussingthelatentmoralconsiderations
oflabpractitioners,particularlythe‘recognition’(quiteliterally)ofpersonalsafetyand
well-being as a moral value. As this behavioral change illustrates, laboratory-based,
collaborative work that was structured by MM was able to accomplish what
regulations up to that point could not. Along with the other examples cited, it also
conﬁrms that MM can encourage ﬁrst-order reﬂective learning by elucidating and
enhancing laboratory decisions, whether aimed at improving the technology (a more
efﬁcient experimental setup, less time-consuming procedures) or achievingone’s own
interests (better research planning, compliance to existing regulations).
Such reﬂection ‘within’ the system of course has value, but more encompassing
reﬂection and learning, such as called for in the ethics of science and technology,
would go beyond issues of compliance and improvement and would enhance the
capacity of scientists and engineers to reﬂect on the broader socio-ethical context of
their work and the reasons for the regulations in the ﬁrst place. It would require
‘broad and deep’ learning (Schot and Rip 1997, p. 257), including second-order
reﬂection on the background theories and value systems of the research context in
which researchers operate.
Reﬂecting ‘on’ the System
In addition to microethical considerations, broader social and ethical dimensions of
research were also regularly discussed during protocol meetings. One example of
second-order reﬂective learning relates to the moral dimensions of genetic
engineering. R1D at one point considered integrating a heterologous gene in the
micro-organism with which he was working. He faced a choice between integrating
a human gene and a mouse gene, both of which fulﬁlled the required characteristics.
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considerations such as substrate speciﬁcity, afﬁnity, capacity, availability of a
plasmid and scientiﬁc novelty. The question of whether integrating a human gene
would be morally acceptable was not discussed. Still, R1D expressed his moral
reservations during one of the protocol meetings:
R1D: I’m cloning a mouse gene, because … I decided like I’m not going to do a
human gene. At least, there was a choice between human and mouse, well, then
I’ll go for mouse, that’s a bit … safer.
I subsequently probed R1D for the moral arguments he might have:
Me: Why would that matter? A gene is a gene, right? A sequence of base pairs
that you can reproduce synthetically.
R1D: It’s an image-thing. Practically, pieces of DNA from one organism work
better than others, and synthetic genes don’t always work optimally, probably
because of interaction with the genome. Where it comes from is important, it’s a
bit … ethical. The DNA is still from that person. You put a piece of human in a
micro-organism. I would have less difﬁculty if we would synthesize the DNA
based on the sequence of a human fragment of DNA.
R1D’s response included some morally relevant dimensions. Beyond the practical
consideration that ‘‘pieces of DNA from one organism work better than others, and
synthetic genes don’t always work optimally’’, he showed awareness of possible
issues in relation to public concern by saying that ‘‘it’s an image thing’’. He also
expressed a moral value with respect to the integrity of the human genome: ‘‘You put
a piece of human in a micro-organism.’’ His response led us to explore each of these
dimensions further. The ‘practical consideration’ prompted discussion about
reductionism: if genes are nothing more than strings of nucleotides, then why would
synthetic genes not work optimally? In addition to further practical considerations
(synthetically produced genes may have overlooked point mutations for example),
we considered the background assumptions behind genetic engineering (the
assumption that genes express proteins may turn out to be more complicated than
expected due to unknown gene–gene interactions in the living system). The potential
for public concern led to a discussion on how to address public concerns about
genetic modiﬁcation. From the possible moral values involved in the acceptability of
using genomic material of human origin came discussion of deontological and
utilitarian views in ethical decision making and the question of normative pluralism.
Evaluating the relevance of these discussions at a later stage, R1D commented:
R1D: I had given it some thought subconsciously, but I never really gave it
careful thought …. Ethics can be very boring, until you reach dangerous territory,
and then it becomes fun.
Thisresponsesuggeststhattheperceivedrelevanceofethicalissuesforresearchers
increaseswhendiscussedinrelationtoconcretesituationsand,furthermore,thattheir
discussion in close proximity to the research activities that occasioned them may
expand the kinds of considerations that researchers invoke when making morally
relevant decisions. These are moments when the embedded ethicist can introduce
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maintaining a direct bearing on the research at hand. There were numerous occasions
for bringing a broader normative perspective to bear on the work done in the
laboratory during the lab studies, for example on the regulation of research on
genetically modiﬁed organisms, intellectual property and the ethics of promising.
Another example of second-order learning occurred when discussing synthetic
biology. While regularly ordering synthetic genes from chemical suppliers, research
participants did not see their own work as being related to synthetic biology, nor to
the ongoing debates on synthetic biology in ethics and the social sciences. Upon
learning that R1D had ordered a synthetic gene I asked:
Me: Would you call this synthetic biology?
R1D: That depends. What is synthetic biology? Much of what is now called
synthetic biology resembles what we do: putting a piece of synthetic DNA in a
host. But I think synthetic biology is making all components synthetically ….
Really to develop a cell from scratch might take another twenty years.
R1D did not consider normative questions on the desirability of building cells
from scratch to be relevant because of the practical complexities involved and the
long time span before that vision might become a reality, whereupon I invited him
to take a historical perspective. I referred to the progress that was made in molecular
biology in recent decades, and how we probably would not have predicted 20 years
ago that ordering a synthetic gene would be a standard procedure by 2010. I invited
him to reﬂect on recent developments from this broader perspective, where 20 years
is just around the corner.
R1D: Then you would need to think about the use, or the goal. If you can build a
cell, then you can build other things as well. We shouldn’t go in the direction of
synthetic higher organisms. There’s always a risk that others move in the wrong
direction. You shouldn’t be using it for other purposes. It’s like a knife: you can
use it for good or for bad …. That’s why we should maybe think about these
things. Then there has to be extra regulation.
Taking the longer-term perspective that ethicists and social scientists may take
when reﬂecting on new developments such as synthetic biology, R1D started to
think about his research in a markedly different way. By contemplating the long-
term impacts of his work, he started to reﬂect on the broader purpose and potential
outcomes of the developments of which his own work was a part, acknowledging
the relevance of broader reﬂection.
A third example of second-order learning concerns the social relevance of
research. Questions concerning the future use of research outcomes were regularly
discussed in each of the studies. Responses from all eight of the research
participants to the two questions on social relevance featured in the pre-interviews
shared a similar ambiguity. All participants responded positively to the ﬁrst
question: does society beneﬁt from research?
C1A: One of the main goals is that society beneﬁts, from any research. It’s not
just a fun thing we’re doing here.
What happens in the Lab 781
123R2A: I wouldn’t see what would be the point otherwise. If it would not help the
rest, if that’s the reason, than usually … Society should beneﬁt; what would be
the point otherwise?
While being convinced of the general societal beneﬁts ﬂowing from scientiﬁc
research, participants had more difﬁculty in predicting the possible beneﬁts of their
own research projects in response to the more concrete follow-up question: does
society beneﬁt from your research?
C1A: I hope so. It’s not my immediate goal; I haven’t thought much about it.
What I’m doing is basic research; this is probably a little bit far away from …
What I’m doing is too far away.
R1A: Honestly, I don’t see any signiﬁcant contribution, no. Maybe there is very
slightly, slightly, indirectly, related to contributing ideas, maybe there is some
technology … But otherwise, the result, for us researchers, we’re excited but for
other people, who cares?
Wanting to pursue this perceived discrepancy between the general beneﬁts of
research and the speciﬁc beneﬁts of individual research projects, I revisited the
question of social relevance throughout each of the studies. Research participants
responded in a similar fashion: a general picture emerged in which the ultimate
beneﬁts of research cannot and should not be accurately predicted. Participants gave
several historical examples of knowledge ﬂowing from basic research that only
much later turned out to have practical use like the invention of the light bulb,
penicillin or X-radiation, and concluded that unrestrained basic academic research is
ultimately more likely to increase the possibility of socially relevant applications
than directly demanding social relevance. Increasing calls for social relevance were
therefore seen to pose a danger to scientiﬁc progress, and ultimately to societal
progress, by stiﬂing the innovative power of research:
R1D: If you invest more in society-improvement, then the learning curve of
science will become less steep. So … in the end it’s less good for science … And
in the end maybe also for society … in the long term.
Interestingly, most of the research projects under study relied predominantly on
funding from private organizations and were strongly driven by the need to deliver
practical applications. When I questioned the amount of freedom involved in
privately funded research, research participants readily acknowledged that their
freedom is limited because of the expectations of the private investor. They saw this
as the inevitable result of decreases in government funding: the only way for a
research group to survive is by strengthening links with private industry. But while
acknowledging that this shift in funding mechanisms limited their academic
freedom, they continued to invoke the principle of unrestrained academic research
to argue against calls for social relevance. Their background assumptions and value
systems were in tension with recent changes in funding mechanisms.
I subsequently tried to challenge their assumptions by ﬁrst assuming them:
supposing that one cannot predict the societal beneﬁts ﬂowing from research, and
therefore academic research should be unrestrained, then how should a private
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necessarily limited?
Me: The question is: how do you make the decisions whether I should fund
genetic modiﬁcation of cyanobacteria, or whether I should maybe fund your
colleagues who do evolutionary growth of cyanobacteria?
R2A: That’s why the, well the way that I thought is that politicians are the voice
of the people, and those are the ones that automatically decide who gets the
money, because they should have, they should know, what people want. So if
people want cleaner fuels, then they give money to cleaner fuel. If people wanted
better dogs, than they would ﬁnd someone else. I think it’s driven like that.
To press the question, I would ask how the research participants would decide
which research to authorize if they were a policy maker. R2A took recourse in a
process of democratic decision making:
R2A: Right, I guess the policy has to be made, [based] on the average of what
people think …. [T]he policy [should not] be made on the thinking of one person
only, but on what most people think.
Me: But how about if big masses of people, like in Europe, say we don’t want any
genetic modiﬁcation? Would you say, well, that’s the majority vote, I’ll just quit
my job and ﬁnd another?
R2A: Probably not like that. But … I tend to be objective on those sorts of issues,
so … Someone who can prove to me that that was the best decision, I would
follow it. If someone would have a good argument I probably would … not quit
my job, but ﬁnd a different approach. I guess, I don’t know.
Such discussions thus problematized the unquestioned assumption that the
demand for societal relevance hampers societal beneﬁt. Research participants
realized that some kind of demarcation criterion was needed to determine which
research to fund, only to realize that this would involve measuring the value of
knowledge as a function of some kind of external relevance, contradicting their
original assumption that the utility of research cannot be predicted.
The MM feedback mechanisms allowed for attending to broader questions as
they impinge on the daily work of researchers, and pointing to possible tensions and
ambiguities in research participants’ responses. The value of these ‘second-order’
discussions lies not so much in having motivated directly observable changes in
practice, but in the fact that participants engaged in critical reﬂection on the broader
socio-ethical context of their work. Participants observed the ambiguity in their
initial responses, realized that some criterion of relevance is needed ‘in the real
world’ to determine what projects to authorize, and showed interest in reﬂecting on
it in more nuanced ways:
R1D: Yeah, you pull … away from the science a little, you put [the science] in a
somewhat different perspective, more like … You look at science as a society so
to say, where all kinds of things happen.
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societal interest is involved when someone does this kind of research …. I think
it’s really interesting that people will start thinking about the use much more.
These ﬁndings suggest that participants began to reﬂect in new ways on the
underlying background theories and value systems operative in research. By
challenging unquestioned assumptions, discussing what future applications could
come out of the research, and sharing different visions on the role of science in
society, the socio-ethical context came to life within the context of research—
something that participants indicated not having experienced before, neither through
their ‘ethics and society’ curriculum nor ethically-oriented funding requirements.
Research participants indicated that the ongoing discussions during and alongside
the actual conduct of research did not hamper, but instead added value to the
research process in several ways. In the words of R1D, ‘stepping into the helicopter’
could serve as a guide to research planning, to identify overlooked opportunities, to
relate lab research to its broader policy contexts, and to uncover latent normative
issues. When during the post-interview I asked R1D whether he thought the study
was useful to him, he replied:
… everybody should perhaps reserve free space in their agendas every now
and then, stop all experiments … and think …. Maybe you could … Should
one integrate this in each and every PhD project? That someone from outside
the faculty comes along, and you need to account for your actions towards that
person. And the guy sitting in front of you would only have to ask: why? Why
this? Why that? Couldn’t you do that differently? And how does it work?
Discussion
These experiences suggest that the broader socio-ethical dimensions of research
were rendered more visible within the research context and that research
participants perceived such broader reﬂection to be relevant. MM served to
encourage researchers to address the socio-ethical context of their work through
collaboration and in real time. The lab studies aligned with the objective of real-
time technology assessment to ‘‘provide an explicit mechanism for observing,
critiquing, and inﬂuencing social values as they become embedded in innovations’’
(Guston and Sarewitz 2002, p. 94) while adopting the overtly normative standpoint
that researchers should engage in critical reﬂection. Like the MM/STIR pilot study
(Fisher 2007), these studies helped bring out latent ethical and societal dimensions
of research, rendering explicit considerations that hitherto remained implicit, at a
time when they could inﬂuence researchers’ decision-making. Unlike the pilot
study, they also aimed to introduce relevant socio-ethical knowledge and
perspectives, and initiate discussion of speciﬁc moral questions as they arise in
the laboratory context. As Ibo Van de Poel and Peter-Paul Verbeek note:
SynergybetweenengineeringethicsandSTS…couldresultinanempiricaland
reﬂexive research, which is empirically informed and critically contextualizes
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effort to actually answer them. (Van de Poel and Verbeek 2006, p. 234)
The approach I adopted in these studies is not morally agnostic. It invokes the
procedural norm that researchers have a moral obligation to critically reﬂect on their
research. Yet a commitment to such ‘deliberative modulation’ does not require the
embedded humanist to enter the laboratory with a predetermined set of substantive
norms; as the laboratory engagement experiences made abundantly clear, the
content of critical reﬂection can only emerge as a result of situated interactions over
time. Such collaborative, situated critical reﬂection combines different ways of
thinking and knowing: those of the laboratory researcher and those of the embedded
social researcher (Gorman et al. 2009). It instilled a sense of urgency, concreteness
and relevance to research participants that differs essentially from reading about
them in a textbook, for example. It also supports early detection and warning signals
of the ethical valence of research outcomes that may otherwise go unnoticed.
Additionally, MM can take a more focused (and less speculative) approach towards
ethical reﬂection that could lead to more meaningful interactions between scientists
and ethicists (cf. Nordmann and Rip 2009). Note however that the sample size of
these lab studies cautions against overgeneralizing: the results need to be compared
with other ﬁndings to conﬁrm or refute these observations.
The perceived value of second-order reﬂective learning proceeds by way of the
perceived value of ﬁrst-order learning, of improving the achievement of one’s own
interests. During each study’s duration, initial reticence from research participants
turned into enthusiasm for discussing both the progress and the broader aspects of
their research. Given that ‘rethinking’ knowledge production in research systems
depends on the willingness of research communities to rethink their own practices,
such collaborative approaches could be more effective than external forms of
critique.
Of course, this dependency on research participants’ willingness to engage
implies certain limitations too. While the ‘voluntaristic’ approach towards
collaborative engagement can enhance researchers’ critical reﬂection, it also builds
an asymmetrical relation between the researchers and the embedded scholar. As a
guest in the research group, the latter is dependent on the acceptance and
endorsement of the hosts, and critical views cannot be allowed to disrupt good
relationships. This may not be a problem if the collaboration is seen by research
participants to be conducive to ﬁrst-order learning, but could become a problem
when there is strong normative disagreement. In those cases, the embedded ethicist
has no ‘jurisdiction’ (Anthony Stavrianakis, personal communication). The need to
respect operative conditions and dynamics within the laboratory inevitably limits
the range of possible critiques. Furthermore, the collaborations are constrained by
their social and institutional environment. Existing, internal responsibilities often
take precedence over a researcher’s broader social responsibilities.
That said, MM has been found to enhance the critical reﬂection of research
participants on the socio-ethical context of their work. Such reﬂection is arguably
needed if other social and ethical programs—upstream engagement, technology
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documented here provides modest indications of Webster’s vision of STS, that is,
helping to set the terms on which science might be accorded a socially
warranted status that in important ways is distinct from, critical of and
supersedes the conventional (scientistic) sense in which science has been
legitimated (Webster 2007, p. 460).
This vision must be tempered by the danger of the STS practitioner becoming an
‘‘integral co-productionist element of the very structures of power and culture which
might be just what STS should be challenging’’ (Wynne 2007, p. 494). This is the
real challenge for the embedded researcher: becoming part of the convergence of
goals, strategies and conﬁgurations of the laboratory insofar as it provides access to
different registers of justiﬁcation (Arie Rip, personal communication), while not
losing sight of the original intentions behind one’s entrance into the laboratory.
Walking the ﬁne line between co-labor and critique may allow different voices to be
heard at the heart of the R&D enterprise, tapping potentials for learning and change
that could prove signiﬁcant.
Conclusion
The laboratory engagement studies described here provide an indication of the
potential for interdisciplinary collaborations to enhance the critical reﬂection of
scientists and engineers, albeit in a relatively small sample size. They demonstrate
that broader socio-ethical dimensions can be productively engaged during
laboratory research. Midstream modulation was found to engender fruitful and
meaningful collaborations between social and natural scientists, encouraging
second-order reﬂective learning while respecting the lived morality of research
practitioners. Not only did it help make broader socio-ethical issues more visible in
the lab, it encouraged research participants to critically reﬂect on these broader
issues. Contrary to their initial claims, participants came to acknowledge that
broader socio-ethical dimensions permeated their research. Importantly, ﬁrst-order
learning seems to be a prerequisite for the possibility of second-order learning:
research participants’ willingness to engage in critical reﬂection on the broader
socio-ethical context of research was seen to be dependent on their perception that
the collaboration also improved the achievement of their own (research) interests.
The ongoing observation-based feedback of the midstream modulation frame-
work and STIR protocol allowed the laboratory researchers and embedded ethicist
to build collaborative capacities and establish conditions for productive reﬂection on
ethical and social considerations. While what counts as an ethical issue is to some
extent a negotiation between the individual collaborators, the procedural norm of
reﬂective learning can guide both practitioners as they deliberatively integrate
socio-ethical assessment with ongoing and future research directions.
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